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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THIS CASE
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3, as an Appeal from a Final Order
entered in a civil proceeding.
RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower Court err in determining that approximately

$148,000 in Trust Deed Notes were part of the marital estate subject
to division when such Notes came from non-marital funds of the KidderPeabody account which were issued after the parties were divorced and
were all payable back into the Kidder-Peabody fund.
2.

Did the lower Court err in failing to recognize the full

amount of the debt which the Defendant owed to Isabel Coats.
3.

Did the lower Court err in arbitrarily charging Defendant

with the marital asset value of $57,300 for the Brandon Canyon
Development when such finding was not based upon any evidence.
4•

Although the Court ordered Defendant to be given a credit

of $4,300 for Plaintiff's sale of the family boat, no such credit was
ever given in the actual accounting.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

During the course of the marriage, the parties had three

children, to wit: Katie, born November 2, 1979; Grace, born June 30,
1982; and Peter, born March 18, 1986.
2.

[TR 140]

Defendant was a real estate broker and the parties started

their own brokerage company out of their home in 1982.
3.

[TR 138]

The Plaintiff worked part time as a receptionist for the

Defendant until the business ultimately moved outside the home in
1986.

[TR 138]
1

4.

After 1986, the Plaintiff was not employed in the market

place, she maintained the household.
5.
well.

[TR 138]

During the course of the marriage, the parties lived very

They lived in a large house in an exclusive area of Salt Lake

County, they purchased what they needed for clothing and vehicles,
they began their own businesses and traveled extensively. [TR 183-184]
6.

Exhibit 27 was entered into evidence and was representative

of the real and actual expenditures for the Plaintiff and the children
taken from a ledger kept for several years demonstrating household
expenditures.
7.

[TR 745]

The Plaintiff testified that Defendant did not actually earn

enough money to support the party's high life style from his real
estate business and that from the beginning of the marriage, the
parties lived off of the Defendant's inheritance to support the life
style which the parties were accustomed to.
8.

The Defendant testified that the parties lived on part of

the dividend from the Kidder-Peabody account.
9.

[TR 750]

[TR 911]

The Defendant testified that he inherited stock from his

grandparents. Rather than passing inheritance from parent to child,
it was passed from grandparent to grandchild in his family.
10.

[TR 906]

Defendant testified that he received blue-chip stock prior

to marrying the Plaintiff and that the stock was placed in a KidderPeabody account.
11.

[TR 907-908]

The Defendant testified that in 1986, over $260,000 stock

that was held by Edward L. Burton Company was placed in the KidderPeabody account.
12.

[TR 908]

The Defendant testified that none of the stock in the

Kidder-Peabody account was ever registered jointly.
2

[TR 909]

13.

The Defendant testified that the only stock which he had

ever been given to the Plaintiff was $10,000 of General Electric stock
in December, 1990.
14.

[TR 909-910]

Plaintiff's accountant, Randy Petersen, testified that the

Defendant was continually moving money from Kidder-Peabody to his own
account. He testified that the Defendant had four bank accounts which
he was using and the money would be transferred from Kidder-Peabody
into these bank accounts.
15.

[TR 560]

Mr. Petersen further testified that money from the Kidder-

Peabody account was moved into one of the four accounts that effected
his personal life as well as his business life and that payments were
made from these accounts for the family home, for improvements on the
family home, purchases of automobiles, trips, clothing and credit
cards.
16.

[TR 562]
Randy Petersen testified that there was no way to determine

the separation of money used by the Defendant and to show that it was
not commingled with his personal life.
verted by Defendant.
17.

This testimony was uncontro-

[TR 562]

Randy Petersen testified that three of the bank accounts

were primarily used for business and personal needs and that the
fourth account opened in 1990 or 1991 was a development account for
Brandon Canyon. He testified that there was an account for the office
through which Peter Coats paid most of his business expenses, that
there was a joint account between Peter and Kathryn Coats, that there
was a personal account which was used for personal expenses, and that
prior to that, Peter Coats had used that account quite extensively for
business in Brandon Canyon and Coats Realty. [TR 563] Defendant continually mixed and commingled his inherited funds with marital funds.
3

18.

The Defendant testified that he would buy a rental home

which would free up their cash so that they could buy the next home
and that a person would go ahead and buy the next home.
19.

[TR 912]

The Defendant testified that he no longer had any of the

rentals, that there was a high cost to maintain them.
20.

The Defendant

[TR 913]

further testified that after he sold the

rentals, he used the stocks in the Kidder-Peabody account, that he
would go ahead and do principal loans or loans on second mortgages to
make it easier for people to purchase.

These were bridge loans with

someone who has a house or property and they are desiring to purchase
another house or property, most often they have to sell that property
before purchasing.

Defendant would come through and say that if they

would buy the property through him, he would guarantee their principal
loan.

They would go ahead and purchase their new home and would then

pay that back when they sold their old house.

The Defendant would

take back a Trust Deed Note. The Defendant did not testify that these
bridge loans occurred after the marriage had been terminated by the
bifurcated proceeding.
21.

[TR 914]

The Defendant testified some of the notes were bad and that

when he was repaid on some other notes, as they were being collected,
the proceeds were spent on living purposes.
22.

[TR 915-916]

Defendant's accountant, Scott Bradford, testified to the

foundation for Defendant's Exhibit No. 59, which was entered into
evidence.

Exhibit No. 59 is entitled "Peter M. Coats Balance Sheet

as of April 30, 1992."
receivable.
23.
between

The balance sheet shows $173,468 in notes

[TR 1112]

Scott Bradford also testified about the major differences
the balance

sheet prepared by Randy Petersen
4

(P-91) and

Defendant's balance sheet

(D-59).

In reviewing Exhibit D-60 (the

comparison of the parties' position prepared by Scott Bradford) , there
are no differences in the gross value of the accounts receivable
notes.

[TR 1115]

24.

The Defendant borrowed funds from his mother, Isabel Coats,

to build "Brandon Canyon," a housing development.
25.

Isabel Coats testified about Defendant's Exhibit No. 50 that

it was an open-ended note [TR 981], that the money was disbursed in
increments from her Kidder-Peabody margin account [TR 981], and that
Exhibit D-50 represented a compilation of the draws against that Note
[TR 982].
26.

Isabel Coats further testified that it was a bona fide loan

to Peter Coats and that she expected payment on that Note.

[TR 982]

All of the letters and notes attached to Exhibit D- 50 added up to
$273,000.
27.

The Defendant's accountant, Scott Bradford, testified that

there was evidence of interest payments to Isabel Coats. He testified
that

the

interest

payments

have

been made

on

a

regular

basis,

approximately quarterly, and that interest was paid through December
31, 1991, as of April 30.

He testified that the quarterly interest

was approximately $7,000, and that the payments were slightly more or
less than that.

He testified that the interest payments began as

early as 1990 and have continued through May, 1992.
28.
Defendant

[1120]

Scott Bradford testified under cross-examination that the
has always had an income history

from notes, and that

Defendant's note generation began in earnest probably within the last
couple of years.
29.

[TR 1203]

David Evans, a land developer for the Plaintiff, testified
5

that as he was doing a title search, he did find a $400,000 lien owing
to Isabel Coats which was recorded by Peter Coats.
30.

[TR 1084]

Melody J. Rasmussen was called as a witness and testified

over Plaintiff's Objection that the Note payable to Isabel Coats was
$401,000.

[TR 1379-1380]
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Standard of Review applicable to appeals involving civil
decrees is stated in Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990),
where the Court said that in a divorce proceeding:
"...determining and assigning values to marital property is
a matter for the trial court and this court will not disturb
those determinations absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion. To permit appellate review of the property distribution,
the distribution must be based upon adequate factual findings
and must be in accordance with the standards set by this state's
appellate court. We will not disturb a trial court's findings
unless they are clearly erroneous, that is, against the clear
weight of evidence or unless we reach a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made."
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The lower Court erred in determining that approximately

$148,000 in Promissory Notes were part of the marital estate subject
to division when such Notes came from non-marital funds such as
Kidder-Peabody

account, were all issued after the parties were

divorced, and all payable back to the Kidder-Peabody fund, is genuinely raised for the first time on this Appeal.

The Appellant genu-

inely failed to raise the issue before the trial Court and the Court
never had a real opportunity to rule on the post-divorce assets issue.
2.

Even if the issue of $148,000 in Notes had been raised at

the trial, the trial Court's determination that the Notes should have
been included in the marital estate is appropriate. It is clear from
the evidence presented to the trial Court that the Promissory Notes
were commingled and became part of the marital estate.
6

3.

The marital estate should be determined at the time of the

trial and the bifurcated divorce proceeding and not at the time of the
determination of the marriage.
4.

The lower Court's recognition of the $240,000 debt owed to

Isabel Coats was fully supportable by the evidence.

Trial Court's

assessment of the credibility of witnesses should not be disturbed on
appeal, and in this instance, the lower Court gave more weight and
credibility to the testimony of Isabel Coats, the holder of the Notes.
5.

The lower Court did not err in charging Defendant with the

marital asset value of $57,300 for the Brandon Canyon development.
It appeared that the Judge's ruling regarding Lot 16 of Brandon Canyon
is more favorable to the Defendant's position and clearly was not an
abuse of discretion.
6.

The Defendant was given the credit

for the $4,300 for

Plaintiff's sale of the family boat, and he will receive the credit
when he pays the estate equalization.
ARGUMENT
I.
A.

THE LOWER COURT'S RULING THAT $173,468 IN TRUST
WERE PART OF THE MARITAL ESTATE WAS NOT A CLEAR
TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION, WAS BASED ON EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT DECISION AND MUST BE

DEED NOTES
ABUSE CF TOE
REASONABLY
UPHELD.

The Appellant's argument that the lower Court erred in determining that approximately $148,000 in Promissory Notes were not part of
the marital estate subject to division when such notes came from nonmarital funds of the Kidder-Peabody account, were all issued after the
parties were divorced, and were all payable back into the KidderPeabody fund, is genuinely raised for the first time on this Appeal.
A.

Principles Regarding Issues Raised for the First Time on

Appeal.

To preserve the substantive issue for appeal, the party must
7

timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial Court, and
provide the Court a genuine opportunity to rule on the issue's merits.
See Turtle Management, Inc., v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667,
672 (Utah 1982); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801-802 (Utah App.
1987).

"Issues not raised in the trial court in a timely fashion are

deemed waived, precluding the appellate court from considering their
merits on appeal."

Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655

(Utah App. 1989); Accord Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. 682 P.2d
832, 837 (Utah 1984); Franklin v. New Empire DEB Company, 659 P.2d
1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). Further, the mere mention of an issue in the
pleadings when no supporting evidence of legal authority is introduced
at trial in support of the claim, is insufficient to raise an issue
at trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.
James, 746 P.2d at 801.

This rule is "stringently applied when the

new theory depends on controverted factual questions whose relevance
thereto was not made to appear at trial," Id, quoting Bogacki v. Board
of Supervisors, 5 Cal 3 D 771; 489 P.2d 537, 543-544; 97 Cal Reporter
657, 653-664 (1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S.C 1030, 92 S. Ct. 1301, 31
L.Ed. 2d 488 (1972) .
In reviewing the transcript of the trial, the parties waived
opening argument which would have been the first opportunity Appellant
had to bring this issue before the trial court. Because the Appellant
waived opening argument, the next portion of the record to examine is
Appellant's testimony.
The Appellant initially testified regarding these Promissory
Notes and stated that they were bridge loans.

[TR 914]

He found

that he could significantly increase his real estate commissions if
he would lend money to home owners thus allowing them to purchase new
8

homes pending the sale of their old homes.

[TR 914]

He further

testified that the intention was to repay the Kidder-Peabody account,
but that happened only about one-half the time.
that

as he was collecting

expenses.

the notes, they were

He also testified
spent on living

[TR 914-915]

On cross-examination, Appellant stated that Defendant's Exhibit
No. 58 and No. 59 represented Defendant's balance sheet. He testified
that many items on the balance sheet were not marital but that the
balance sheets did represent the parties' assets and liabilities. [TR
1437-1438]

Defendant did not ever testify as to what assets were not

marital other than the Kidder-Peabody account.
While redirecting Appellee, Mr. Larew stated to the Court in
reference to the purpose for Exhibit D-78:
To trace the funds, your Honor, to trace the funds in and
out of Kidder-Peabody, the purpose of these is directly from the
Kidder-Peabody, interests alone, and some of them come back out
with the dates we've already gotten into. It shows they were
post-divorce related. I propose to show, your Honor, that they
were separate property, not marital property to define them more
clearly." [TR 1495]
However, Mr. Larew did not ever define what property was separate
and what property was marital.
post-divorce

acquisition

This was the only examination about

of assets during the entire trial.

In

closing argument, Mr. Larew stated:
"As far as its identity being lost, we've identified
promissory notes coming out of the Kidder account, Exhibit No.
78, containing the notes, funds drawn out of the Kidder account
with identification on the checks being drawn out that it was
going for a particular transaction, particular procedure, which
resulted in a promissory note being received by Mr. Coats.
"It's identity has not been lost, has not been commingled
with other funds.
Mrs. Coats' name is not on any of those
notes. She has no legal interests in any of them of any sort
and the most that can be argued is that she has an equitable
interest by virtue of her marriage. But that fails as it's Mr.
Coats' own property.
9

The Court asks:
Are you saying that any sub-division or
speculative adventure that the Defendant had gone into, using
the funds of Kidder-Peabody and so forth, should be kept
completely out of the marital assets?
Mr. Larew: Not necessarily. I think that could be that way.
I think that is a fact question._ I think that depends on how
well they were segregated and maintained and not commingled and
lost to identity
The Court: Are you saying that he should retain the KidderPeabody stocks and all those assets, and that the sub-division,
Brandon, would use that one and the note payable on that should
be payable on the marital estate?
Mr. Larew: No, I am saying the notes payable—on which note
payable, Isabel Coats or the one he's— he's...
The Court: The notes payable to Isabel Coats and to the KidderPeabody funds. He owes money back to that fund?
Mr. Larew:
That's right, he does. I think those are—the
Kidder-Peabody funds I think
is, without question, still
maintained by way of its integrity; it's gone in and out without
losing that integrity.
The Court: If he loses the fund from the Kidder-Peabody to
assimilate wealth during the marriage, does that become part of
the marital estate?
Mr. Larew:

That accumulation—yes, yes.

The Court: Then you are saying his notes back to Kidder-Peabody
would also be part of the marital estate?
Mr. Larew: Not the principal. The note amount due that he
borrowed from the Kidder-Peabody notes he may have written to
Kidder-Peabody well I must be missing something because I see
the principal comes out of Kidder, the principal comes into a
note and if that money is drawn off for living expenses for
payments, then yeah, that increase, whatever that increase
whatever—whatever it's used for is part of the marital estate.
But that principal does not, by coming out into a note, transform it into a marital asset.
The Court: Then you are saying you adopt the position taken by
the Plaintiff in their Exhibit No. 90 and not 91? No. 90 is the
one without the Kidder-Peabody—No, 91 is without the KidderPeabody; 90 is the one with Kidder-Peabody.
Mr. Larew:
Well, to the extent they eliminate the KidderPeabody, yes, I would. That's—I don't think the Kidder-Peabody
is appropriately a part of the marital estate. [TR 1288-1290]
Later on in closing, Mr. Larew states:
10

I want to address the promissory notes to make sure that we are
clear on that. The promissory notes used funds coming out of
the Kidder-Peabody. We maintain those are the sole property of
Mr. Coats because they have not been commingled or lost through
exchange. They were clearly identified and readily traceable.
Would the Court have any questions about those? [TR 1305]
Clearly, the Appellant failed to genuinely raise the issue before
the trial Court.

The Court never had a real opportunity to rule on

the "post-divorce assets" issue.

Defendant allows the Court to admit

the Plaintiff's Exhibits P-90 and P-91 which includes the Promissory
Notes.

At one point, Defendant even accepted the Plaintiff's exhibit

P-90 which values the Notes as a marital asset.

Defendant's counsel

in closing stated:
The Court: Then are you saying you adopt the position taken by
the Plaintiff in their Exhibit 90 and not 91? No, 90 is the one
without Kidder-Peabody. No, 91 is without the Kidder-Peabody;
90 is the one with Kidder-Peabody.
Mr. Larew:
Well, to the extent that they eliminate KidderPeabody, yes, I would. That's—I don't think the Kidder-Peabody
is appropriately part of the marital estate. [TR 1290]
The Defendant's own exhibit, the Defendant's Balance Sheet, D-59,
contains these Notes as assets. The Appellant is arguing against his
own exhibits submitted at trial.
B.

The Defendant is now attempting for the first time to value

some assets at the time of divorce rather than at the time of trial.
These are the only assets and/or liabilities that Defendant attempts
to value at the time of divorce rather than at the time of trial.
Without argument, Defendant accepts the position that all other assets
are valued at the time of trial.

In and of itself, that is a new

issue before the Court.
B.

EVEN IF THE ISSUE OF $148,000 IN NOTES HAD BEEN RAISED AT
THE TRIAL, THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE NOTES
SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE MARITAL ESTATE IS APPROPRIATE.

Mortenson

v.

Mortenson,

P.2d
11

304

(Utah

1988),

states

that

equitable property division pursuant to the divorce statute should
generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance, or a property acquired in exchange thereof, to the spouse who
received the gift, together with any appreciation or enhancement of
its value, unless the other spouse has by his or her effort or expense
contributed to the enhancement, maintenance or protection of that
property, thereby acquiring equitable interest in it, or if property
has been consumed

or its identity

lost through commingling

or

exchanges or when acquiring spouse's new gifts of interest bearing to
the other spouse. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, (Utah App. 1990), the
Court states that inherited or donated property may be part of the
marital estate, subject to division incident or to divorce, if nonreceiving spouse augments, maintains or protects property through his
or her efforts, the parties having

inextricably commingled

the

property with the marital property so that it has lost its separate
character or the recipient spouse has contributed to all or part of
the property to the marital estate.

In Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314

(Utah App. 1980) the Court states that premarital property will lose
its separate distinction when the parties have inextricably commingled
it in the marital estate, or when one spouse has contributed all or
part of the property in the marital estate.
Plaintiff's accountant testified that the Kidder-Peabody account
was used on a daily basis by the Defendant and could not be considered
a separate asset of the Defendant.

He further testified that the

Defendant had four bank accounts which he was using and money would
be transferred from Kidder-Peabody into these bank accounts. [TR 560]
Mr. Petersen testified that there was no way to show that it was not
commingled with Defendant's personal life.
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[TR 562]

The Defendant

testified that he would go ahead and do principal loans or loans on
second mortgages to make it easier for people to purchase. These were
essentially bridge loans.

He further testified that when the notes

were repaid, they were spent for living purposes.

[TR 915-916] None

of this testimony was ever controverted.
It is clear from the evidence presented to the trial Court that
the Promissory Notes were commingled and became part of the marital
estate.
C.

THE MARITAL ESTATE SHOULD BE DETERMINED AT THE TIME OF
TRIAL IN A BIFURCATED DIVORCE PROCEEDING.

Bifurcation

occurred in this matter when the parties were

divorced on March 15, 1991. The parties specifically agreed that all
issue, except the granting of the Decree of Divorce, were reserved for
further determination by the Court at a time convenient to the Court
and counsel.
The Defendant argues that $148,000 in Promissory Notes was postdivorce and should not have been valued in the marital estate.
The bifurcation was necessary to the Plaintiff's mental and
physical health.

A letter was submitted from Dr. Lowry A. Bushnell

stating that the Plaintiff was under extreme mental anguish and
anxiety due to the long process of the settlement of her pending
divorce.

Dr. Bushnell goes on to recommend that for the Plaintiff's

good and well-being that the parties be divorced prior to the
settlement. A letter was submitted from the psychotherapist, Thomas
G. Harrison, stating that the parties' divorce be granted as soon as
possible in order to allow the family to even out emotionally.

A

letter from Bishop James E. Gleason was submitted which stated that
the Defendant had invited a new girl friend and her children to live
in with him and this is clearly an embarrassment to the Coats children
13

while at school, and that the stresses arising out of this situation
would be partially alleviated if their father was no longer married
to their mother. As such, the bifurcation was necessary to the wellbeing of the Plaintiff and the parties' children.

Even though the

parties were divorced, all property issues remained outstanding. As
such, the standards set forth in Howell v. Howell, 155 Utah Adv. Rep.
18, should apply.

In Howell, the Court stated that the standard of

living in setting alimony should consider the standard of living
during the marriage up to the time of trial. The same standard should
apply to valuation of the estate.

The bifurcation was necessary to

the well-being of the Plaintiff and the minor children. However, the
only issue that was resolved by the issue of bifurcation itself was
the termination of the marriage.

There had been no discovery, no

assessment of value, no settlement proposals; in fact, the proceedings
had only begun. All other remaining issues were reserved. Therefore,
the Howell standard applies, and the Court properly valued the
Promissory Notes at the time of trial.
It is not unusual that cases arise where a divorce must be
granted.

In the present case, two experts and an ecclesiastical

leader indicated that divorce was essential to the well-being of
Plaintiff and the children. If the Court determined valuation of the
marital estate at the time of divorce in bifurcated proceedings, the
result would be that there would be no bifurcated proceedings and
families would suffer.

So little is known about the marital estate

at the time of bifurcation that a reasonable attorney would never
advise bifurcated proceedings if it would impact the position of the
estate.

The purpose of bifurcated proceedings is to protect the

emotional interest of the spouse and children.
14

This Court cannot

allow bifurcated proceedings to be lost as a remedy for that purpose.
II.
THE LOWER COURT'S RECOGNITION OF THE $270,000 DEBT OWED TO
ISABEL COATS IS FULLY SUPPORTABLE BY THE EVIDENCE.
The Trial Court's Assessment when Judging Credibility of the
Witness Should Not be Disturbed on Appeal.
Findings of Fact in divorce appeals are subject to the clearly
erroneous standard of review such that "due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses."

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a); Jense v.

Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1989).
Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1991), states that the District
Court's Findings of Fact are based on a Judgment of the credibility
of the witnesses.

It is the province of the trier of fact who

assesses the credibility of witnesses, and we will not second guess
the trial court when there is reasonable evidence to support its
findings.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) states:

"Effect.
In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon,
and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting
or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are
not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the
court.
It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court
following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need
not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The decision on all
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground."
The Appellant argues that the lower Court erred in failing to
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recognize the full amount of debt that Defendant owed to his mother.
The Defendant requested that Isabel Coats be called as a witness out
of

order

because

she had

to return

to California.

Mrs. Coats

testified on direct examination to the authenticity of a Promissory
Note executed by Peter M. Coats (Exhibit No. 50). She testified that
it was an open-ended Note and that she did not recall the exact day
when she received it.

She testified that the money was disbursed in

increments from her Kidder-Peabody margin account as necessary for the
Brandon Canyon development.

She testified that she would contact her

brother, Fred Moreton, at Kidder-Peabody and would either write him
a letter or telephone and follow up with the letter regarding the
disbursement.

Mrs. Coats was handed Exhibit P-50 and asked whether

the letters attached to the Note represented the draws against the
Note and she replied, "yes."

She testified that the Promissory Note

was bona fide and that she expected repayment.

On cross-examination,

Mrs. Coats testified as follows:
Q.

Mrs. Coats, I am going to hand you the original note
which has been marked as Defendant's Exhibit No. 50, and I
am going to go through a bit of your testimony.
You
testified to the Court that you received that note during
January of 1990. Is that correct?

A.

I am sorry, counsel, I do not know that it was January it
came. It probably was put in the bottom of a file drawer
and I can retrieve it.

Q.

I did understand your testimony correctly when I heard
you say to the Court that you received it before March 3,
1990; that is the second page of the document?

A.

I believe so, yes.

Q.

Ms. C o a t s —

A.

It was.

Q.

—Isn't it true, and I want to ask this question to you
in the straight-forward fashion, isn't it true that this
note was manufactured by Peter Coats after the commencement
of these proceedings and sent to you at a date long after
16

Kathryn Coats commenced these proceedings for divorce?
No.
So you received then that note in its original form on a
date sometime in early 1990?
Yes.
Ms. Coats.
I want you to look at the notary stamp on
that document. Do you see who it was notarized by?
Yes.
What's the name there?
Janet H. Wilkinson.
Do you know Janet H. Wilkerson?
Yes.
That is Peter's secretary?
Do you know that she didn't
begin to work for Peter until after January 1990 sometime?
I didn't know when she started to work.
I want to ask y o u —
May I answer:
notarized.

I do not know that the note I have is

Isn't this the note you have in front
testified this is the original note.

of

you?

You

Yes, but I don't know whether this business on it at the
bottom was there when I got the note.
You told the Court that it was, you
received in its
current form. Do you change your testimony at this point?
I cannot be sure, sir.
I will ask you this question, and I preface it with
something which the Court may take judicial notice of, and
I would ask the Court to do so, that the notary bond is
issued in this State for four year's of validity; that is,
that it is only valid for four years.
Ms. Coats, you
notice that the stamp date on the expiration for Janet
Wilkerson is September 10, 1995. Do you see that on the
document in front of you?
It must be on this thing.

Yes, I see it, yes.

You subtract from 1995, it would not be possible for this
notary bond to have been
issued prior to September 20,
17

1991.

So do you realize that?

A.

I did not realize that, and I do not realize that—I'm
sorry, I do not. I was looking at the top part of the note
that Peter signed to Wally and me.

Q.

I'm going to ask you the question one more time. This
note in fact was manufactured by Peter and sent to you long
after these divorce proceedings began, wasn't it?

A.

No.

Q.

Didn't Peter indicate to you
trial in front of the Court
was no evidence documenting
you, that you would have to
this note?

A.

No.

Q.

And you say that even in light of the fact that this note
could not have existed in its present form prior to
September 20, 1991?

A.

As I say, I do not know that this bottom was on the note
he sent me.

Q.

Ms. Coats, these copies of the letters, did you prepare
those on a date subsequent to September 20, 1991, at your
son's request?

A.

No, I did not.

that as a result of the preand the assertion that there
the $400,000 in liability to
have a note, and he sent you

[TR 988-991]

She further testified:
Q.

Continuing this cross-examination, your Honor, if I may.
As I understand your testimony, the documents the Court has
admitted, Defendant's Exhibit No. 50, the promissory note,
then this supplemental documents that support the funds you
loaned to Peter, is that—

A.

That's for Brandon Canyon, for this last question.

Q.

As I understood your testimony, you loaned up to
$400,000, and as the note says it was from $400,000, that
Peter was not to borrow in excess of that amount in any
event.

A.

He was not to borrow more than $400,000 under this note.
I do not know if it was—the note was never—.

Q.

Alright.
And he borrowed he borrowed—you've written
letters to your brother and told your brother to make
changes or disbursements so that it could be accomplished?

A.

Yes.
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Q.

That is the intent of the document?

A.

That's the intent of the document. [TR 999]
In closing argument, the Plaintiff's counsel argued that
the Defendant is not beyond creating documents because D-50
is a document where the notary stamp had an expiration date
of September 20, 1995, and the date on the Note was
January, 1990. Plaintiff's counsel argued pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 46-1-3(4) which states that each notary
public shall be commissioned for the term of four years
unless the commission is revoked under Utah Code Annotated
§ 46-1-16, or resigned.

Melody

J.

Rasmussen,

testified as to the loan.

CPA

assisting

Defendant

in

his

case,

The Plaintiff's counsel objected to this

witness based on lack of foundation.

The Court overruled these

objections and held that Ms. Rasmussen's testimony was relevant and
also allowed the introduction of Exhibit D-72 into evidence.

This

exhibit contained numerous letters and accountings from Mrs. Coats,
but Isabel Coats did not testify to their authenticity.

In addition,

copies of the checks which Defendant claimed to be interest payments
on loans were contained in Exhibit D-72. Ms. Rasmussen testified that
as of April 30, 1992, there was $401,000 owing on the note and $10,025
of accrued interest owed.

[TR 1379]

The Defendant testified that there was a debt owed back to his
mother, however, he was unable to testify as to the amount.
The Defendant's argument that the lower Court rejected the claim
of

$411,000

on the assumption

that the testimony

of Mrs. Coats

directly contradicted testimony of the accountant is
erroneous.

The Court stated:

"The Court has to determine what is most believable, what
was the best testimony, and I questioned counsel on what the CPA
yesterday testified to as far as the accounting, and the Court
is not persuaded that she—and I am not stating—well, I believe
she is stating it truthfully for the information that she had,
and the Court is not making any accusations as far as any
information being generated, except that the Court cannot
reconcile in its mind if there was an obligation of $411,025,
that when the mother was here and on the stand, that would not,
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have been brought out, especially when they said she had to
leave and they wanted to get her on: So what I am saying is I am
adopting $270,000 as the note due Isabel Coats." [TR 499-500]
Defendant makes the argument that Plaintiff's accountant, Randy
Petersen, acknowledges that he was aware of Defendant's $400,000 claim
concerning the Note to Mrs. Coats and acknowledged that if there was
such a valid Note, then Defendant should be given the liability
deduction.

Plaintiff does not dispute this argument by Defendant.

Plaintiff, her counsel and expert were all aware of Defendant's
allegations, but allegations are not facts. The Defendant also makes
note of testimony of David Evans who testified that he also learned
of a lien of Mrs. Coats for $400,000 and, in fact, a property search
on property owned by Peter Coats revealed a $400,000 Trustee note;
however, this simply

identified a recorded document and is not

evidence of an actual Note.
The trial Court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses
should not be disturbed on appeal and in this instance, the lower
Court gave more weight and credibility to the testimony of Isabel
Coats, the holder of the Note, finding that Defendant could have
recalled Isabel Coats if the Note were more than she testified, but
she was not recalled.
III.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN CHARGING DEFENDANT WITH THE
MARITAL ASSET VALUE OF $57,300 FOR THE BRANDON CANYON
DEVELOPMENT.
The Defendant acquired a real estate development project known
as Brandon Canyon during the course of the marriage.

[TR 1048-1049]

The Defendant funded Brandon Canyon through his mother and his KidderPeabody account.

[TR 1048-49]

The Plaintiff valued Brandon Canyon

as follows [Exhibit P-91]:
#23 BC

$ 30,899

[DBS D-58]
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#24
#28
#15
#16
#17

[testimony]
(DBS D-58]
[testimony]
[testimony]
[testimony]

28,000
18,750
165,000
171,900
176,900
$591,449

The Defendant valued Brandon Canyon at $319,117 [Exhibit D-99].
The Court adopted Defendant's valuation of Brandon Canyon.

Paragraph

14(i)(2) of the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
states:
"The Brandon Canyon cash amount stated as a negative dollar
value of $6,266.00 should be eliminated. In addition, the note
on Lot 23 for Brandon Canyon, Lots 4, 15, 16 and 17, Brandon
Canyon, should all be eliminated. The Court is not thoroughly
convinced that the Court has received all of the information
relating to Brandon Canyon as an asset. However, the Court is
reasonably persuaded that the values stated by the Defendant of
$319,117.00 is a reasonable value to be attributed to Brandon
Canyon, except for the fact that the Defendant has received or
will receive additional money for the sale of lots, for example,
he has already sold Lot 16 for $171,900.00 The Court finds that
as Brandon Canyon is developed and the lots are finished, the
Defendant will sell more homes and will receive additional
profit. The Court finds that the evidence is so conflicted that
it will be necessary to adopt some arbitrary number to determine
the value. Accordingly, the Court is convinced that the value
of Brandon Canyon is at least some portion of Lot 16 which has
been sold, and the value stated by the Defendant of $319,117.
While it is arbitrary, the Court finds that the only reasonable
method for placing a value on Brandon Canyon is to take onethird of the value of the sale of Lot 16, which was $171,900.00
and add that to the values stated by the Defendant.
Accordingly, Court finds that the value of Brandon Canyon is
$319,117.00 plus $57,300.00 for a total value of $376,417.00 and
Brandon Canyon will be awarded to the Defendant at that value."
The Court

appears to take an arbitrary position in valuing

Brandon Canyon.

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 31 originally had Lot 16

valued at $85,517.

However, that amount is modified in exhibit P-90

after the Defendant testified that Brandon Canyon Lot No. 16 was sold
for $171,900.

The Defendant testified as of April 30, 1993, that the

value of Lot 16 was $105,000, and that value was included in the value
of $319,117 presented by Defendant as the value of Brandon Canyon.
It would appear that the Judge's ruling regarding Lot 16 of Brandon
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Canyon was not all that arbitrary and is more favorable to the
Defendant's position than was realized at the time of the trial. The
lower Court could have taken the difference between $171,900 less
$105,000 and assigned an additional value of $65,000 to Brandon Canyon
rather than the $57,300 which the Court found there was no abuse of
discretion.
IV.
THE DEFENDANT WAS GIVEN THE CREDIT
PLAINTIFFS SALE OF THE FAMILY BOAT.

OF

$4,300

FOR

In reviewing the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Supplemental Decree of Divorce, the Defendant was given
credit for the Plaintiff's sale of the family boat.

Paragraph 14(h)

of the Supplemental Findings of Fact states:
"The Court has received a great amount of testimony
regarding the boat and its value, but the Court was persuaded
from the outset, and is even more convinced after hearing all of
the testimony, that the Plaintiff had possession of the boat,
she did not have sufficient funds to pay her expenses and to
raise her children because the Defendant was not paying child
support or alimony as ordered, and she sold the boat to meet the
family needs. The best evidence before the Court is that the
Plaintiff received $4,300.00 from the sale of the boat. While
the Court is of the opinion that the boat was worth more than
$4,300.00, and in fact, the Plaintiff received more than
$4,300.00, but after the payment for repairs and other costs,
the net benefit to the Plaintiff was $4,300.00. It was as a
result of actions on the part of the Defendant, by his failure
to pay support as ordered, that the Plaintiff received only
$4,300.00 for the sale of the boat. The Court finds $4,300.00
to be the best value to be attributed to the boat, and the boat
should be awarded to the Plaintiff.
However, in light of
amounts, which are discussed later, the amount attributed to the
value of the boat to the Plaintiff will be taken off of the
division of assets."
Therefore, the Appellant is mistaken regarding this issue; the
Defendant has been given credit and this issue should be dismissed.
He will receive the credit when he pays the estate equalization.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant's argument that the lower Court erred in determin-
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ing that approximately $148,000 in Promissory Notes were part of the
marital estate subject to division when such Notes came from nonmarital funds of the Kidder-Peabody account, were all issued after the
parties were divorced, and were all payable back into the KidderPeabody fund was genuinely raised for the firs time on this Appeal.
The Appellant failed to genuinely raise the issue before the trial
Court and the Court never had a real opportunity to rule on the postdivorce assets issue.

In addition, even if the issue of the $148,000

of notes had been raised at the trial, the trial Court's determination
that the Notes should be included in the marital estate is appropriate
based on the evidence presented at trial that the Promissory Notes
were commingled and became part of the marital estate.

Finally, the

marital estate should be determined at the time of the trial and
bifurcated divorce proceeding.

The evidence clearly indicates that

bifurcation was necessary for the well-being of the Plaintiff and the
minor children, and that the only issue which was resolved by the
issue of bifurcation itself was the termination of the marriage.
There have been no discovery, no assessment of value, no settlement
proposals;

in fact, the proceedings

remaining issues were reserved.

had only begun.

All

other

As such, the Court properly valued

the Promissory Notes at the time of the trial.
The lower Court's recognition of the $270,000 debt owed to Isabel
Coats

is fully

supportable by the evidence.

The trial

Court's

assessment of the credibility of the witnesses should not be disturbed
on Appeal, and in this instance, the lower Court gave more credibility
to the testimony of Isabel Coats, the holder of the Note.
The lower Court did not err in charging Defendant with the
marital asset value of $57,300 for the Brandon Canyon development.
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The Judged

ruling regarding Lot

16 of Brandon Canyon is more

favorable to the Defendant's position, and it is clear there was
no abuse of discretion in this matter.
The Defendant was given the credit of $4,300 for Plaintiff's sale
of the family boat and Appellant is mistaken regarding this issue.
The Defendant will receive the credit when he pays the estate
equalization.
CROSS-APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
7.

Did the Court commit error by awarding Defendant rights of

visitation

without

supervision

in

contradiction

to

the

expert

testimony presented to the Court.
8.

Did the Court commit error by directing the Plaintiff to

replace Mr. Tom Harrison with another counselor as the children's
counselor.
9.

Did the Court commit error by directing that the payment of

alimony would terminate ten years from the date of commencement, which
date of the commencement for the payment of alimony was June 16, 1992.
10.

Did

the

Court

commit

error

in

its

finalization

of

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 91 as follows:
a.

By valuing Northridge furnishings at $4,500 and awarding the

furnishings at that value even though the Defendant has testified at
trial that the value of said property was $18,000;
b.

By discounting notes receivable on Plaintiff's Exhibit 91

at a discount rate of 20% instead of 10%;
c.

By eliminating Target Capitol as an asset of the marital

estate even though the parties agreed that it was an asset;
d.

By

failing

to recognize

the entire

liability

of the

Plaintiff to her father, Kenneth Tuck, which was incurred during the
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divorce proceedings to pay attorney's

fees, expert

fees, and to

maintain the family when he failed to pay support.
11.

Did the Court err by failing to award the Plaintiff all

attorney's fees and costs incurred in these proceedings.
12.

Did

reasonable

the

fees

Court

for

the

err

by

failing

experts,

i.e.,

to

award

the

accountants,

Plaintiff

appraisers,

engineers and other experts who appeared on her behalf and assisted
her in the preparation and presentation of her case.
13.

Did the Court err by allowing the Defendant to be awarded

any of the minor children as dependents for the purposes of filing his
state and federal income taxes.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Plaintiff was 19 years old at the time of marriage and

had completed one year of college.

The Defendant had completed three

years of undergraduate education and attended college the last time
in 1982.
2.

[TR 700]
The

Plaintiff

testified

that

she anticipates

attending

Holland's College in Roanoke, Virginia, in a program for displaced
homemakers.

The Plaintiff testified that she was going to study

psychology and obtain a Master's Degree so that she could pursue a
career as a school psychologist.
3.

[TR 701]

The Plaintiff testified that she has not worked even part-

time since she was in high school and has not been employed on a
regular basis.
4.
skills.
5.

[TR 703]

The Plaintiff testified that she did not have any marketable
[TR 703]
The Plaintiff testified that she tried to attend USF Real

Estate Examination Course this last summer and did not complete the
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course, but that it is her desire to complete her education.
6.

[TR 700]

The Plaintiff testified that it is her desire based on the

report of Dr. Reisinger and reviewing the testimony of Mr. Harrison
that there be supervised visitation.
7.

[TR 202]

The Plaintiff testified that the Defendant has demonstrated

violent behavior immediately preceding the parties' separation in
1989-1990.
8.

[TR 766]

The Plaintiff testified that on one occasion in the middle

of the night, she was asleep when the Defendant threw a lamp across
the room then he went downstairs and punched a hole in the wall because he was angry that Plaintiff had hung up a necklace on a hook so
he ripped it off the wall and then broke the necklace.
9.

[TR 766-767]

The Plaintiff testified to Exhibit No. P-34, a letter

written by the Defendant stating that he was a sexaholic.
10.

[TR 203]

The Plaintiff testified that there had been virtually no

visitation by the Defendant since March, 1992, with the exception of
one visitation that occurred in December, 1991.
11.

The children's therapist for almost two years, Thomas J.

Harrison, LCSW, testified that Mr. Coats has significant emotional
problems and mental health disorder.
12.

[TR 664]

Mr. Harrison testified that the Defendant is in need of

significant treatment individually and is in need of treatment with
his children conjointly before he should be allowed to visit with them
without supervision.
13.

[TR 664]

Mr. Harrison testified that he believed there is a potential

for danger to the children if visitation occurred without supervision.
[TR 665]
14.

Mr. Harrison testified that Defendant has a history of a
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Mr. Harrison testified regarding his concerns that Defendant

has an inability to relate to personal needs of the children; that he
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has an agenda; that he has an inability to understand the children's
feelings; to count their feelings, to relate to how they feel.

The

children shared this information to Mr. Harrison through play therapy
and conversational therapy and they indicated lack of interaction with
their father which says their father does not have the ability to move
out of his own personality, his own needs, and relate appropriately
to the children.
22.

[TR 671]

Mr. Harrison testified that he saw strong signs of a

personality disorder.
23.

[TR 672]

Mr. Harrison testified that he had seen no improvement

whatsoever

in Defendant

in regards to his mental disorder and

personality disorder and that Defendant is unable to be a functional
parent to his children.
24.

Mr. Harrison

[TR 672]
testified

that

he is concerned

children's emotional safety and personal safety.
25.

[TR 673]

Mr. Harrison testified that he has not personally witnessed

interaction between Mr. Coats and the children.
26.

for the

[TR 674]

Mr. Harrison testified that he had a minor difference with

the Defendant and hung up the telephone with Mr. Coats because he had
already shared with Mr. Coats what he was going to do for the
children.

Mr. Harrison felt that the Defendant was angry, frustrated

and wanted Mr. Harrison to do something which Mr. Harrison thought was
not proper for him to do.
27.

[TR 680]

Mr. Harrison testified that on a supervised level, the

Defendant should have regular visitation but without any overnight
visitation.
28.

[TR 686]

Plaintiff's Exhibit P-14 was submitted without objection.

Exhibit P-14 is the psychological visitation evaluation conducted by
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basis will likely instill the most sense of trust in the children.
g.

The adjustment from supervised to unsupervised visitation

should be determined by the children's therapist as well as by the
family

therapist

based

upon

the

children's

progress

in

their

relationship with their father. Once visitation is determined to be
unsupervised, these need to be outlined specifically in order to avoid
conflicts.

At no time should Mr. Coats have visitation with the

children and have a female companion present unless he plans to remarry.

Overnight visits should be reserved for later when the

children feel comfortable with them.

These should never be forced.

It is likely that Peter, Jr., will be able to have unsupervised and
overnight visits sooner than the girls. However, this should not be
pushed too quickly.
h.

If at all possible, as soon as the intensity between Mr. and

Mrs. Coats is reduced in terms of their own relationship, therapeutic
mediation should assist them in coming to terms with providing the
children with the opportunity of having a safe and healthy relationship with both parents.
29.

The

Defendant

[TR 659]
testified

that

he was

involved

with a

relationship group which had 25 people in the class which dealt with
issues of divorce and children and being able to communicate on a fair
basis.
30.

[TR 1419]
The Defendant testified that he had been to see a psycholo-

gist, Dr. Kenneth Jackson, who is a therapist in Provo.

[TR 1420]

He did not say how often.
31.

The Defendant testified that he has not taken the children

to see Dr. Jackson.
32.

[TR 1422]

The Defendant testified that Dr. Reisinger's report was in
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37.

Ms. Gomez testified that the children were attached to thei r

father, they were happy to meet with him, a**~ ^.ijoyed the visits.
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Ill

o i e t a l . 1 value..
1

T

marital estate

41.

11 mi I mi II

I In

deposition testimony of Kenneth Tuck who had been previously called,
sworn and testified in the case as a witness for the purpose of a
trial".

[TR 540-541] Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5 was admitted without

objection.
42.

Kenneth Tuck testified that the Plaintiff had executed

Promissory Notes to him for $4,350, $3,785, $7,649, $11,237, $4,951,
$4,290 and $4,725.
43.

Mr. Tuck testified that the Promissory Notes were payable

at a rate of 9%.
44.

[Deposition pp. 4-8]

[Deposition p. 8]

Mr. Tuck testified that it was not his intent to forgive the

Promissory Notes and he expected full payment.
45.

Mr. Tuck

testified

that

most

of

[Deposition p. 9]
the bills were

for

professionals and, as the bills would come in, he would pay for them.
[Deposition p. 13]
46.

Plaintiff testified that she borrowed money from Mr. Tuck

signed Promissory Notes for the amounts borrowed.
47.

[TR 739]

Plaintiff testified that she owes Mr. Tuck in excess of

$40,000 incurred for living expenses, attorney's fees and expert
witnesses.
48.

[TR 740]

The Plaintiff testified that she was willing, as long as she

was not paying taxes, to allow Defendant to use one or even two of the
children as dependents, but when she was required to pay taxes, she
wanted those dependant exemptions for herself.
49.

[TR 765]

The Plaintiff testified that if the exemptions would provide

the Defendant greater benefit, then she was willing to allow him to
purchase those exemptions for the value of the cost to her.
50.

[TR 765]

The Plaintiff provided foundation to Plaintiff's Exhibit No.

P-37, entitled Plaintiff's Attorney's Fees.
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conducted services for the Bar and for the community, both for the lay
community and the legal community as well as the judicial community,
and has served on that Committee for about five years. He testified
that he bills at the rate of $140 per hour but will bill the Plaintiff
at the rate of $135 per hour because within 30 days after the Plaintiff retained his services, his fees were increased to $140. [TR 2843]
57.

Plaintiff's counsel testified that his legal assistant, Dee

Ann Keller, has had twelve years of experience in the legal community.
He testified that she generally saves clients an extraordinary amount
of money by taking their telephone calls, helping them through
problems

which

occur,

helping

them

with

preparation

of

their

documents, by helping them to get to Court and by helping them get
their problems solved.

He further testified that his effective

billing rate for trial time is $185 an hour which includes Dee Ann
Keller's time.
58.

[TR 280-282]

Defendant's

counsel

did

not

cross-examine

Plaintiff's

counsel or object to the reasonableness of the attorney's fees.
59.

The Plaintiff testified that experts in this case were

necessary because of Defendant's failure to cooperate in discovery and
payment of support.

[TR 778-779]
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

1.
visitation

The Court committed error by awarding Defendant rights of
without

supervision

in

testimony presented to the Court.

contradiction

to

the

expert

The lower Court fully erred in

refusing to adopt the positions of Dr. Mercedes Reisinger and the
children's therapist, Thomas Harrison.

Dr. Reisinger's report was

admitted into evidence without objection or cross-examination and
stands on its own as the preponderance of evidence on the issue of
34

visitation.

Both professionals

clearly

stated that

supervised

visitation would be necessary and in the children's best interest.
The evidence presented by Dr. Reisinger and Mr. Harrison is overwhelming, and it is clear that the Court simply ignored the evidence presented and abused its discretion by entering the Order which it did.
2.

The Court committed error by directing the Plaintiff to

replace Mr. Thomas Harrison with another counselor as the children's
counselor.

The Court's rationale behind this was that there existed

animosity between the Defendant and Mr. Harrison. However, the Court
failed to recognize the recommendation of Dr. Reisinger who stated
that the children should continue in therapy with Mr. Harrison.

In

addition, Mr. Harrison had been treating the children for almost two
years, and the children had gained trust and confidence. It is clear
that the Judge failed to consider the children's best interest in this
matter and considered only the best interest of the Defendant.
3.

The Court committed error by directing that alimony

would terminate ten years from the date of commencement which was June
16, 1992. The parties in this case were married over thirteen years,
constituting a long-term marriage.

In Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1

(Utah App. 1992) , the Court upheld and awarded permanent alimony based
upon a six-year marriage.

The facts in the Watson case are similar

to the facts in the present case, and it is clear that the Court
abused its discretion by limiting the term of alimony.
4.

The Court committed error in its finalization of Plaintiff's

Exhibit P-91 as follows:
a.

By valuing Northridge furnishings at $4,500 even though the

Defendant has testified at trial that the value of said property was
$18,000.

The only evidence regarding valuation of the Northridge
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property was the Defendant's own testimony. The Court was clearly in
error by arbitrarily reducing the amount from $18,000 to $4,500.
b.

By discounting notes receivable from Plaintiff's Exhibit No.

91 as a discount rate of 20% instead of 10%.

Plaintiff no longer

seeks relief on this issue and accepts the Court's valuation.
c.

By eliminating Target Capitol as an asset of the marital

estate even though the parties agreed that it was an asset.

Even

though there was no testimony regarding this asset, it's value was
undisputed based on Plaintiff's Exhibit P-91 and Defendant's Exhibit
D-59.

The Court simply refused to include it in the marital estate,

and the case should be reversed on this issue with instructions to set
the value stipulated by both parties and include Target Capitol as an
asset of the marriage which is awarded to Defendant.
d.
Plaintiff

By

failing

to recognize

the

entire

to her father which was incurred

liability

of the

during the divorce

proceedings to pay attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and to
maintain the family.

The testimony regarding liability owed to

Plaintiff's father was undisputed.

Therefore, the Court should

recognize the entire liability owed by Plaintiff to her father.
5.
attorney's

The Court erred by failing to award the Plaintiff all
fees and costs incurred

in these proceedings.

The

Plaintiff testified pursuant to Plaintiff's Exhibit P-5 and Exhibit
P-37 that her attorney's fees were in excess of the $20,000 awarded
by the Court as attorney's fees.

Such award entirely ignored the

liability owed to Tuck. Plaintiff's counsel testified to the amount
and reasonableness of attorney's fees and Defendant's counsel did not
object. The Court made the finding on the total legal fees but simply
ordered Defendant to pay only $20,000 of those fees offering no
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explanation of the reduction and failure to recognize the liability
to Mr. Tuck.

Because of the evidence of Plaintiff's attorney's fees

is adequate and undisputed, the Court abused its discretion in not
awarding all the fees.
6.

The Court erred by failing to award the Plaintiff reasonable

fees for experts, i.e., accountants, engineers, appraisers and other
experts who appeared on her behalf and assisted her in the preparation
and presentation of her case.

Plaintiff testified that she incurred

expert witness fees in the case and that it was her desire to be
awarded 100% of those expert fees which total $14,200.

Peterson v.

Peterson. 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 1991), applies to the facts of this
case, and the Plaintiff should be awarded expert fees in the sum of
$14,200. The Plaintiff testified that she would have to liquidate the
marital estate in order to pay expert fees and attorney's fees if the
Court did not award such fees.

The lower Court's decision to deny

expert fees in this case should be reversed with instruction to award
$14,200 in expert fees.
ARGUMENT
V.
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY AWARDING DEFENDANT RIGHTS OF
VISITATION WITHOUT SUPERVISION IN CONTRADICTION TO THE
EXPERT TESTIMONY PRESENTED TO THE COURT.
The statutory standard governing visitation is "best interest of
the child."

U.C.A. § 30-3-10.

The lower Court clearly erred by

refusing to adopt the positions of Dr. Mercedes Reisinger and the
children's therapist, Thomas Harrison.

Dr. Reisinger's report was

admitted without objection or cross examination and stands on its own
as the preponderance of evidence. Notably, Dr. Reisinger's evaluation
was a visitation evaluation done only for the purpose of determining
appropriate visitation by the Defendant who is an admitted sex addict.
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Both professionals clearly stated that supervised visitation would
be necessary

and

in the children's best

interests.

The only

contradiction to their recommendation of supervised visitation is the
Defendant's own testimony, which certainly cannot be relied upon as
an expert, and statements made by Ms. Francis Gomez, who was hired by
the Defendant to supervise the visitation and certainly did not
qualify as an expert.

Ms. Gomez did write a report on her own

volition regarding visitation, and even in her own report, she stated
that she noticed a remarkably conflicted relationship between the
Defendant had the oldest daughter.

The evidence presented by Dr.

Reisinger and Mr. Harrison is overwhelming and clear that Defendant's
visitation should be supervised.

The Court clearly ignored the

evidence presented and abused its discretion by entering an Order
which contradicted the evidence presented.

The Court clearly chose

to simply ignore the testimony of the experts and particularly the
report of Dr. Reisinger.

It was as if the visitation evaluation and

the report were never written. Greater abuse of this issue could not
have been committed by the Court. The matter should be remanded with
instruction to follow the recommendations of the experts.
VI.
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY DIRECTING THE PLAINTIFF TO
REPLACE MR. TOM HARRISON WITH ANOTHER COUNSELOR AS THE
CHILDREN'S COUNSELOR.
The Court ordered that the Plaintiff replace the children's
therapist, Thomas Harrison, with another therapist.

The Court's

rationale behind this was that there existed animosity between the
Defendant and Mr. Harrison.

[TR 493]

The Court, however, failed to recognize the recommendation of Dr.
Reisinger that states that the children should continue in therapy
38

with Mr. Harrison.

In additionf Mr. Harrison had been treating the

children for almost two years and the children had gained trust and
confidence.

It is clear that the Judge failed to consider the

children's best interest in this matter, but considered only the
interest of the Defendant.

Simply because Defendant testified that

he did not like Mr. Harrison, the Court ordered the change.

Again,

the Court abused its discretion by placing Defendant's interests ahead
of the children's.

This matter should be reversed
VII.

THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY DIRECTING THAT ALIMONY WOULD
TERMINATE TEN YEARS FROM THE DATE OF COMMENCEMENT WHICH WAS
JUNE 16, 1992.
Trial Courts have broad discretion in making alimony awards.
Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421-423 (Utah App. 1990).

The appeals

Court will not upset a trial Court for the award of alimony so long
as the trial Court exercises its discretion within the appropriate
legal standards, Id.

The Court will not disturb the trial Court's

award of spousal support absent a showing of clear and prejudicial
abuse of discretion, Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96-100 (Utah 1986).
The Courts have developed three factors which must be considered
in affixing a reasonable alimony award:
a.

Financial conditions and needs of the wife;

b.

The ability of the wife to produce income for herself;

c.

The ability of the husband to provide support.

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).

Failure to consider the

Jones factors in fashioning alimony awards constitutes an abuse of
discretion.

Stephens v. Stephens, 54 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah 1988).

The matter of appropriate alimony was addressed in Gardner v.
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988).
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An alimony award should after a

marriage such as this and to the extent possible, equalize the
parties' respective standard of living and maintain the standard of
living as close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during
the marriage. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), Higlev
v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379-381 (Utah 1983), Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647
(Utah 1988).

The Court reaffirmed its position in Gardner when it

restated the three factors for consideration of alimony and stated
that all three factors must be considered and the ultimate test of
propriety of an alimony award is whether, given all of these factors,
the party receiving alimony will be able to support himself or herself
"as nearly as possible at the standard of living...enjoyed during the
marriage."

Jones, 700 P.2d 1075 (quoting English 565 P.2d 411).

The majority of the Court intended the principle stated in
Gardner and reaffirmed in Davis to have particular significance when
it stated:
An alimony award should, after a marriage as this and to
the extent possible, equalize the parties' respective standards
of living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to
the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.
In Howell v. Howell 802 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991, the Court
applied the equalization standard in conjunction with the Jones
factors.

The Court stated:

Trial courts must consider the following factors in setting
alimony: (1) the financial needs of the recipient spouse; (2)
the recipient's ability to produce income; and (3) the ability
of the payor spouse to provide support. Davis v. Davis. 749 P.2d
649 (Utah 1988)
The parties in this case were married over thirteen years,
constituting a long-term marriage.

In Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1

(Utah App. 1992), the Court upheld an award of permanent alimony based
upon a six-year marriage.

The facts in Watson are similar to the

facts in the present case; both Mrs. Coats and Mrs. Watson did not
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work outside the home but remained in the home to care for the children. Mr. Watson had an average gross income of $93,688.75,

and Mr.

Coats' average gross income was determined to be $137,596. It is clear
that the Court abused its discretion by limiting the term of alimony.
VIII.
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR
IN ITS
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT P-91 AS FOLLOWS:
Standard of Review.

FINALIZATION

OF

A standard of review applicable to appeals

involving divorce decrees is Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App.
1990).

The Court stated that in a divorce proceeding:

Determining and assigning values to marital property is a
matter for the trial court, and this court will not disturb
those determinations absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion. To permit appellate review of the property distribution,
the distribution must be based upon adequate factual findings
and must be in accordance with the standards set by this state's
appellate courts. We will not disturb a trial court's findings
unless they are clearly erroneous, that is, against the clear
weight of the evidence, or unless we reach a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.
A.

BY VALUING NORTHRIDGE FURNISHINGS AT $4,500 EVEN THOUGH IE
DEFENDANT HAS TESTIFIED AT TRIAL THAT THE VALUE OF S A I D
PROPERTY WAS $18,000.

Defendant testified that the value of the Northridge furnishings
were $18,000.

[TR 456]

On cross-examination, Plaintiff's Exhibit P-80 was admitted into
evidence listing the personal property located at Northridge along
with certain values.
On cross-examination, the Defendant testified that his values may
be retail; however, the Defendant accepted $18,000 as the value of the
Northridge furnishings.

The Judge stated in his Bench ruling that:

Now the Northridge furnishings, I am not persuaded that, as
the Defendant was on the stand and testified, that he understood
the appraisal situation as far as personal property is concerned, I know he didn't.
I think he was stating what the
allowable was that the property had to him, and probably it is
good property, and probably it cost that much, and it was
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valuable.
It is very understandable
opinions that he did.

for him to give the

But this court is not persuaded by that, and I just have to
arbitrarily—I'm no appraiser and I can't sit down and go over
each one of those items and say it should be this and that. I
am cutting that appraisal down to one-fourth. I think that's
about what the other appraisals have been, and I am awarding the
property to him for the sum of $4,500.
The only evidence regarding valuation of the Northridge property
was the Defendant's own testimony as to the values.

The Court was

clearly in error by arbitrarily reducing the amount from $18,000 to
$4,500.

The case should be reversed on this issue with instructions

that the value of the "Northridge personal property" is $18,000
B.

BY DISCOUNTING NOTES RECEIVABLE ON PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT NO. 91 AS A DISCOUNT RATE OF 20% INSTEAD
OF 10%.

Plaintiff no longer seeks relief on this issue and accepts the
Court's valuation.
C.

BY ELIMINATING TARGET CAPITOL AS AN ASSET OF
THE MARITAL ESTATE EVEN THOUGH THE PARTIES
STIPULATED THAT IT WAS AN ASSET.

Both parties agreed that Target Capitol was an asset.

Even

though there was not testimony regarding this asset, its existence and
value is undisputed but the Court simply refused to include it in the
marital estate.

This case should be reversed on this issue with

instructions to include Target Capitol as an asset of the marriage,
set the value stipulated by both parties, and award the asset to
Defendant as agreed.
D.

BY FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE ENTIRE LIABILITY OF
THE PLAINTIFF TO HER FATHER WHICH WAS INCURRED
DURING THE DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS TO PAY ATTORNEYS
FEES, EXPERT FEES AND TO MAINTAIN THE FAMILY.

In considering this issue, the Court will need to recognize that
the liability to Mr. Tuck includes attorney's fees and expert fees,
and when determining this issue, the Court must consider VIII.D., IX.
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and X. as part of this point.

The trial Court did not recognize the

liability owed to Mr. Tuck and failed to recognize that the bulk of
the liability was attorney's fees, expert fees and living expenses
incurred because Defendant failed to pay support as ordered by the
Temporary Order.
The Court admitted Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5 without objection
as the trial testimony of Plaintiff's father, Kenneth Tuck, who had
been previously called, sworn and testified at deposition in the case
as a witness for the purpose of trial.

Mr. Tuck testified that the

Plaintiff, had executed Promissory Notes to him for $4,350, $3,785,
$7,649, $11,237, $4,951, $4,290 and $4,725. Mr. Tuck testified that
the Promissory Notes were payable at the rate of 9% and that he
expected full payment of these Notes. He testified that most of the
bills were for professionals and as bills would come in, he would pay
for them.

The Plaintiff also testified that she borrowed money from

her father, Mr. Tuck, and signed Promissory Notes for the amounts
borrowed. The Plaintiff testified that she owed her father in excess
of $40,000 incurred for living expenses, attorney's fees and expert
witness fees. The testimony regarding liability owed to Mr. Tuck was
undisputed.

Therefore, the Court

should

recognize

the entire

liability owed by Plaintiff to her father, which was incurred during
the divorce proceedings to pay attorney's fees, Muir v. Muir, 847 P.2d
736 (Utah App. 1992), expert witness fees, Peterson v. Peterson, 818
P.2d 1305-1309 (Utah App. 1991), and to maintain the family.
IX.
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO AWARD THE PLAINTIFF ALL
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN THESE PROCEEDINGS.
A trial Court may use its sound discretion to award attorney's
fees in divorce proceedings pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3
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(1989).

Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305-1309 (Utah App. 1991);

Val v. Val, 810 P.2d 489-493 (Utah App. 1991).
-In using its sound discretion, the trial Court must take into
account three factors: (1) the financial need of the receiving spouse;
(2) the ability of the other spouse to pay; and (3) the reasonableness
of the requested fee.

Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 493 (Utah App. 1991);

Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Utah App. 1988).

The

District Court has discretion to order either party to pay the other
party's attorney's fees in a divorce action.

Utah Code Annotated §

30-3-3 (1989); Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 162, (Utah App.
1989).

Where the "evidence supporting the reasonableness of the

requested attorney's fees is both adequate and entirely undisputed...the court abuses it's discretion in awarding less than the amount
requested unless the reduction is warranted by one or more of the
established factors."
(Utah App. 1989)

Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 517-518

The Plaintiff testified pursuant to Plaintiff's

Exhibit P-5 (the liability to Mr. Tuck) and Exhibit P-37, when taken
together, that her attorney's fees were substantially in excess of the
$20,000 awarded by the Court as attorney's fees. Such award entirely
ignored the liability to Mr. Tuck and the fees he had paid for
Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff's counsel then testified to the amount and

reasonableness of attorney's fees.

The Defendant's counsel did not

object. The Court made no finding on the total legal fees but simply
ordered Defendant to pay only $20,000 of those fees, offering no explanation for the reduction and the failure to recognize the liability
to Mr. Tuck.

Because the evidence of Plaintiff's attorney's fees is

adequate and entirely undisputed, the Court abused its discretion.
All of the fees paid by Plaintiff's father and all fees incurred
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and/or outstanding for the trial should be awarded to Plaintiff.
X.
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO AWARD THE PLAINTIFF REASONABLE
FEES FOR EXPERTS, I.E., ACCOUNTANTS, APPRAISERS, ENGINEERS AND
OTHER EXPERTS WHO APPEARED ON HER BEHALF AND ASSISTED HER IN THE
PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION OF HER CASE.
Plaintiff testified that she incurred expert witness fees in the
case and that it was her desire to be awarded 100% of those expert
fees which totaled $14,200.

[TR 780-781]

In closing argument, Plaintiff's counsel argued that the Court
may award expert fees.

Counsel went on to argue that if there were

ever a case where the expert fees were justifiably incurred and made
necessary by lack of cooperation and contemptuous behavior by the opposing party, it was in this case. The Judge stated from the Bench:
The court has read the case of Peterson v. Peterson and I
am not persuaded. I am sure Mr. Craig Peterson will probably
not agree with this, but I am not persuaded that the case
completely holds that professional experts, accountants,
doctors, engineers and so forth, that it goes completely that
far.
I think it does go to the situation as far as the marital
patentings of the parties, evaluators and I think the case also,
I don't think it hold's this alone, but I know it says at one
point that it can come off the top out of the marital assets of
the marital parties.
What I am saying again, I am going to deny an order for any
professional fees in this case.
The standard for reviewing an award of costs is an abuse
discretion standard. Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990).
Weiss v. Weiss, 179 P.2d 109 (Utah 1947), states that the Court has
sound discretion to weigh circumstances of the parties and determine
whether one spouse should give financial assistance to the other
spouse to prosecute or defend a divorce action.

The appellate Court

must then determine whether the trial Court was within its sound
discretion in awarding or not awarding the disputed costs. Peterson
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v, Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305-1309 (Utah App. 1991), specifically states:
Section 30-3-3 empowers a court to use its sound discretion
to define costs of those reasonable amounts that are reasonably
expended to prosecute or defend a divorce action. We also hold
that Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3 empowers a court to use it
sound discretion in determining whether the award of costs based
on need and ability to pay.
It is clear that the Peterson standard applies to the facts of
this case, and that Plaintiff should be awarded expert fees in the sum
of $14,200. In Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1983), the Court
justified an award of attorney's fees and stated that the Plaintiff
does not have to liquidate the assets of the marital estate which are
awarded to her in order to pay her attorney's fees.

In the present

case, the Plaintiff testified that she would have to liquidate the
marital estate in order to pay expert fees and attorney's fees if the
Court does not award such fees.

The lower Court's decision to deny

expert fees in this case should be reversed and the Court instructed
to award Plaintiff $14,200 in expert fees.
XI.
THE COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT TO BE AWARDED ANY
OF THE MINOR CHILDREN AS DEPENDENTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF
FILING STATE AND FEDERAL TAX RETURNS.
The trial Court's awarding the tax exemption to the Defendant
violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution in
light of the 1982 Tax Reform Act and its effect on 26 U.S.C., § 152(e)
(1988).

Trial Court's award of the tax exemption is contrary to

federal law and Utah's interpretation of the general requirement
imposed by § 152(e) of the Internal Revenue Code.

Martinez v.

Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 72 (Utah App. 1988) and Fuller v. Fullmer, 761
P.2d

942, 950

(Utah App.

1988).

The trial Court was without

jurisdiction to enter an Order contrary to the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Service code.
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In addition, this Court recently held in Allred v. Allred, 835
P.2d 974 (Utah App. 1992) that as to the tax issue, relying on Motes
v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989) , and 26 U.S.C. § 152(e) (1988)
from the federal tax code, that the trial Court's award of the exemption to the non-custodial parent must meet two requirements before
an exemption may be awarded to a non-custodial parent.

First, the

non-custodial parent must have a higher income and provide the majority of support for the child; second, the trial Court must, from its
findings, determine that by transferring the dependency exemption to
the non-custodial parent, it is not only in the best interests of the
parties, but, more importantly, it is also in the best interests of
the child, which in all but exceptional circumstances will trans-late
into an increased support level for the child.

No such finding was

made in this case and the Defendant cannot be awarded the exemptions.
CONCLUSION
1.
visitation

The Court committed error by awarding Defendant rights of
without

supervision

in

testimony presented to the Court.

contradiction

to

the

expert

The lower Court fully erred in

refusing to adopt the positions of Dr. Mercedes Reisinger and the
children's therapist, Thomas Harrison.

Dr. Reisinger's report was

admitted into evidence without objection or cross-examination and
stands on its own as the preponderance of evidence on this issue.
Both professionals clearly stated that supervised visitation would be
necessary and in the children's best interest. The evidence presented
by Dr. Reisinger and Mr. Harrison is overwhelming, and it is clear
that the Court simply ignored the evidence presented and abused its
discretion by entering the Order which is now appealed.
2.

The Court committed error by directing the Plaintiff to
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replace Mr. Thomas Harrison with another counselor as the children's
counselor.

The Court's rationale behind this was that there existed

animosity between the Defendant and Mr. Harrison. However, the Court
failed to recognize the recommendation of Dr. Reisinger who stated
that the children should continue in therapy with Mr. Harrison.

In

addition, Mr. Harrison had been treating the children for almost two
years, and the children had gained trust and confidence. It is clear
that the Judge failed to consider the children's best interest in this
matter and considered only the interest of the Defendant.
3.

The Court committed error by directing that alimony

would terminate ten years from the date of commencement which was June
16, 1992. The parties in this case were married over thirteen years,
constituting a long-term marriage.

In Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1

(Utah App. 1992), the Court upheld and awarded permanent alimony based
upon a six-year marriage.

The facts in the Watson case are similar

to the facts in the present case, and it is clear that the Court
abused its discretion by eliminating the term of alimony.
4.

The Court committed error in its finalization of Plaintiff's

Exhibit No. 91 as follows:
a.

By valuing Northridge furnishings at $4,500 and ordering the

furnishings at that value even though the Defendant has testified at
trial that the value of said property was $18,000. The only evidence
regarding valuation of the Northridge property was the Defendant's own
testimony as to the values.

The only evidence before the Court was

the Defendant's valuation, and the Court was clearly in error by
arbitrarily reducing the amount from $18,000 to $4,500.
b.

By discounting notes receivable from Plaintiff's Exhibit No.

91 as a discount rate of 20% instead of 10%.
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Plaintiff no longer

seeks relief on this issue and accepts the Court's valuation.
c.

By eliminating Target Capitol as an asset of the marital

estate even though the parties agreed that it was an asset.

Even

though there was no testimony regarding this asset, it's value was
undisputed based on Plaintiff's Exhibit P-91 and Defendant's Exhibit
D-59.

The Court simply refused to include it in the marital estate,

and the case should be reversed on this issue with instructions to set
the value stipulated by both parties and include Target Capitol as an
asset of the marriage.
d.
Plaintiff

By

failing

to recognize

the entire

to her father which was incurred

liability

of the

during the divorce

proceedings to pay attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and to
maintain the family.

The testimony regarding liability owed to

Plaintiff's father, Kenneth Tuck, was undisputed.

Therefore, the

Court should recognize the entire liability owed by Plaintiff to her
father which was incurred during the divorce proceedings to pay
attorney's fees, expert fees, and to maintain the family.
5.
attorney's

The Court erred by failing to award the Plaintiff all
fees and costs incurred

in these proceedings.

The

Plaintiff testified pursuant to Plaintiff's Exhibit P-5 and Exhibit
P-37 that her attorney's fees were in excess of $20,000 awarded by the
Court as attorney's fees. Such award entirely ignored the liability
owed to Mr. Tuck.

Plaintiff's counsel testified to the amount and

reasonableness of attorney's fees and Defendant's counsel did not
object. The Court made the finding on the total legal fees but simply
ordered Defendant to pay only $20,000 of those fees offering no
explanation of the reduction and failure to recognize the liability
to Mr. Tuck.

Because of the evidence of Plaintiff's attorney's fees
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is adequate and undisputed, the Court abused its discretion, and all
the fees paid by Plaintiff's father and all fees outstanding for the
trial should be awarded to the Plaintiff.
6.

The Court erred by failing to award the Plaintiff reasonable

fees for experts, i.e., accountants, engineers, appraisers and other
experts who appeared on her behalf and assisted her in the preparation
and presentation of her case. Plaintiff testified that she incurred
expert witness fees in the case and that it was her desire to be
awarded 100% of those expert fees which total $14,200.

Peterson v.

Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 1991), applies to the facts of this
case, and the Plaintiff should be awarded expert fees in the sum of
$14,200. The Plaintiff testified that she would have to liquidate the
marital estate in order to pay expert fees and attorney's fees if the
Court did not award such fees.

The lower Court's decision to deny

expert fees in this case should be reversed and instructed to award
$14,200 in expert fees.
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